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Toward A New U.S. Human Rights Policy: An
Interim Proposal
by Patricia A. Mayne*
It is so easy to wound with words, and so easy to seem superficially plau-
sible if one has no regard for truth.'
The Dalai Lama
I. INTRODUCTION
T here is a great disparity between the hopes expressed in numerous
articles concerning human rights and the actual problems with which
we are faced regarding the implementation of such rights. Historical and
cultural differences are blithely overlooked in the pursuit to find a univer-
sal ground on which to base a claim of human rights for all people. Analy-
sis which ignores these differences ignores the substantive basis on which
rest solutions to the problems of the definition of human rights and the
subsequent implementation of those rights.
This note is an attempt to provide a fresh analytical starting point
for a practical assessment of human rights on a national and global level.
The first section addresses some of the inadequacies in the current theo-
retical foundation for human rights. The next section gives a general
overview of the problems inherent in attempts made by the United States
to implement its standard of human rights throughout the world. The
final section recommends an interim proposal for adoption by the United
States which would reduce the discrepancy between our human rights
goals and our actual human rights accomplishments. The proposal is in-
terim rather than "ultimate" because achievement of human rights is an
evolutionary process and not a single. end-point goal.
II. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR THE INTERIM PROPOSAL
The body of law concerning human rights is a relatively recent addi-
tion to international law. Traditionally, international law was concerned
*J. D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University, 1983.
1 THE DAAI LAMA op TmET, My LAND AND My PEoPLE 218 (1962).
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almost exclusively with resolving conflicts between sovereign states.
Under this law, individuals had no internationally recognized rights and
were accorded international legal status only by virtue of being citizens of
a sovereign State.2 Infringements against the rights of the citizens of a
sovereign country by another country were violations of the first country's
sovereignty.3 Only on such a limited basis was international law con-
cerned with the rights of individuals. A sovereign country could do as it
liked with its individual citizens within its own territorial borders.4
A significant change in international law concerning human rights oc-
curred after the genocidal travesties of the Second World War.5 The U.N.
Charter proclaims that one of the purposes of the United Nations is to
expend efforts "in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms." Subsequent documents embodying this
purpose include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Inter-
national Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights," the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (and associated Optional
Protocol),9 the International Covenant on the Elimination of all Forms of
Racial Discrimination, 0 and the Convention on the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of Crime of Genocide.1 While many countries have become par-
ties to the Declaration, the Covenants, and the various Conventions, the
record of the United States in signing these documents has been bleak.12
(The reasons for this record will be discussed in section III of this Note
herein.) Even without explicit recognition by all countries, however, these
2 See generally H. STmunR & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 33-49 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as STENER & VAGTs]. The nationals of sovereign states have traditionally
been protected when living, travelling, or doing business in foreign countries only by refer-
ence to their sovereigns. Although areas such as deportation, exclusion, and the rights of
aliens have been increasingly liberalized in many countries in recent years in terms of cer-
tain rights of individuals qua individuals, under international law individuals are still offi-
cially treated as subjects of particular sovereigns in regard to their individual rights.
3Id.
4 See H. STmNmR & D. VAGTS, supra note 2, at 329 where the authors state that the
rules of classical international law "expressed the duties and rights of states, not
individuals."
5 See Lane, Demanding Human Rights: A Change In The World Legal Order, 6 HOF-
STRA L. Rxv. 269, 281 (1978). The atrocities committed by the Nazis against individuals,
collective ethnic and religious groups, and minorities generally alerted the international
community to the need for international documents protecting the rights of individuals
everywhere in the world.
U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 4.
G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
• GA. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
9 G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
10 G.A. Res. 2106A, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 47, U.N. Doe. A/6014 (1965).
1 G.A. Res. 260A, U.N. Doe. A/810, at 174 (1948).
1" See STmNER & VAGTS, supra note 2, at 387-88.
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documents have been increasingly relied upon to supply the "customary"
definition of the rights of individuals under international law and of the
obligations of states to accord their citizens certain basic rights.13 The
significance of the use of the Universal Declaration, the Covenants, and
the various Conventions as a customary standard for human rights is that
they bypass the sovereign in several areas of human rights concerns.1 4
The result is that under certain circumstances interference with the gov-
ernmental conduct of a sovereign state is not only allowable but condoned
by the world community.15
The problem which has arisen in using a customary standard for
human rights is that countries of various ideological persuasions have
tended to emphasize those parts of the standard that support their ideo-
logical point of view and have tended to ignore or downplay those parts of
the standard that fail to support their viewpoint. For example, scholars
and statesmen from the United States tend to emphasize the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in their approach to human
rights because as a nation the United States is dedicated to the concept
of individual rights.16 In contrast, scholars and statesmen from the
" Funk, International Law as Integrators and Measurement in Human Rights De-
bates, 3 CASE W. Ras. J. hIr'L L. 123, 127 (1973).
14 Ferguson, Global Human Rights: Challenges and Prospects, 8 DEN. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 367, 371-2 (1979).
15 "Human Rights imply corresponding duties which devolve on states: direct rights of
human beings infer limitations on the powers of States." (Emphasis added.) Dinstein, Col-
lective Human Rights of Peoples and Minorities, 25 INT. & COMp. L.Q. 102 (1976).
The hope of human rights advocates generally is to effect a limitation upon the ability
of governments to offend the basic dignity of their citizens. This limitation is generally con-
ceived to be implemented either by external enforcement of these standards on individual
states or, preferably, by internal implementation of these standards through domestic law
within individual states. Almost all literature written in the human rights field is premised
on the inherent need to place certain limitations on the behavior of any state towards its
citizens.
[O]ne of the greatest contributions of the twentieth century to the development
of civilization is the recognition of the principle that the historical accidents of
national boundaries cannot be used as pretext for ignoring the human misery and
degradation taking place along the arduous path leading from the consent of na-
tions to the community of man. And we are not yet much beyond the first step.
Wolf, At the Apex of the Value Hierarchy - An International Organization's Contribution,
24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. Rnv. 179, 180-181 (1978).
16 See, e.g., comments made by Patricia M. Derian, Assistant Secretary for Human
Rights and Humanitarian Affairs in the U.S. Department of State, such as:
[Tihere is nothing parochial about the principles the United States seeks to pro-
mote. They respond to the universal yearnings of all mankind and have been
adopted by virtually all governments .... Do the critics really mean to suggest
that people struggling to break the bonds of mass misery are content permanently
to trade their freedoms for material advancement? Those who make these sugges-
tions fail to recognize the deepest aspirations of human beings.
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U.S.S.R. tend to emphasize the International Covenant on Economic, So-
cial and Cultural Rights in their approach to human rights because as a
country the U.S.S.R. is dedicated to the concept of social rights.17 Thus,
while there is international agreement on the necessity of protecting
human rights, consensus has not yet been reached as to what particular
rights are or should actually be protected by the general standard:18
[T]o rely upon those doctrines of classic international law as a founda-
tion for this generation of rights generated by the United Nations is a
reliance on false premises. This premise is a fundamental, theoretical
problem of whether or not there is a basis for global consensus in
human rights. We do not find it in religion; we do not find it in tradi-
tional international law; we do not find it in the historical origins of the
period of the Enlightenment. 19 (Emphasis added).
This lack of basic idealogical agreement in the area of human rights has
been exacerbated in recent years by the urgent needs and demands of the
Third World countries. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
the Conventions and Covenants are primarily oriented to the viewpoints
of the relatively few countries which are already industrialized. This ori-
entation has ignored the needs and viewpoints of countries which contain
90% of the world's population.20 The developing countries of the Third
World now face far more immediate population, economic, and social
Derian, Human Rights: Principles and Realism, 64 A.B.A. J. 198, 199 (1978). See generally
Jenkins, The Concept of Rights and the Competence of Courts: Health Care As a Right, 18
Am. J. Junis. 1, 8-9 (1973), where that author distinguishes between "traditional" rights as
being civil and political liberties as compared with "new" rights which encompass economic
and social rights.
17 See, e.g., Kudryavtsev, The Truth About Human Rights, 5 HUM. RTs. 193, 199
(1976), where the author says, "A right is an opportunity guaranteed by the state to enjoy
social benefits and values existing in a given society." (Emphasis added). In criticizing the
Western concept of human rights as being "anarchistic discourses on human rights," the
author also says:
The bourgeois idealogues would make it appear as if human rights have nothing to
do with the social and political nature of the given social system and state, and
that the citizens' duties are something alien to the individual and imposed on him
by society .... [Hiuman rights are a social and class concept. There are no
human rights in the abstract, in isolation from society.
Id. See also Szawlowski, International Protection of Human Rights, 28 INT'L & Comp. L. Q.
775 (1979) for a more expansive exposition on the Soviet concept of human rights. See gen-
erally, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT. L. 249-500 (1980) for additional information regarding Soviet
concepts of human rights and various implementation difficulties faced by the U.S.S.R.
10 Contra, Marks, Emerging Human Rights: A New Generation for the 1980's, 33
RUTGERS L. Rnv. 435, 451 (1981), where he states that, "It is... true that the essential nor-
mative task in the field of human rights was accomplished during the first three decades
after the founding of the U.N., and that the more urgent task now is implementation."
19 Ferguson, supra note 14, at 371.
20 Id. at 374.
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problems than the United States, the European countries, or the U.S.S.R.
have had to face at any time in their development.21 The complex of
stresses that face the Third World countries may provide the spawning
ground for the synthesis of individual and social rights which must occur
before an integrated theory or standard of human rights can be
conceived.
Suggestions have already been made as to how to achieve this syn-
thesis. While basic needs such as food and shelter are the primary con-
cern of most Third World leaders, it is possible to begin to meet these
needs and still provide for a certain minimum of civil and political rights.
Neville Linton, a Third World scholar, writes:
Controls and acceptance of a common discipline for the sake of develop-
ment do not necessarily mean that basic civil and political rights have to
be suppressed and no one who looks at the writings of such thinkers as
Franz Fanon or Julius Nyerere can have any doubt that in the Third
World there are leaders who believe that it is possible to mobilise the
people for development while keeping to democratic tenets."
Following this thesis, Linton proposes a certain minimum of civil and po-
litical rights that he believes should be maintained while Third World
countries pursue their development." Any determination of minimum
civil and political rights will require substantial debate and that debate
should take place primarily in Third World countries. The determination
of minimum civil and political rights should be made on the basis of
Third World perceptions of their own needs.
S. Prakash Sinha has proposed a theory for human rights based on
each country's needs and stages of development which he calls an "an-
thropocentric" theory.24 The purpose of this theory is to "bypass the na-
tion(al) state, rather than attempting to overcome it, through organizing
internationally the achievement of certain specific values or the fulfill-
ment of certain specific needs." 25 Sinha defines primary needs which
every society needs to provide (or try to provide) for its citizens to be air,
food, water, procreation, and protection from war, crime, disease, starva-
21 Linton, World Development, Change and The Challenge of Human Rights, 1978
N.Y.L.J. 242, 246 (1978). There the author writes: "fM]ost underdeveloped countries cannot
make progress by following the route of the now developed countries - the international and
national, social, economic, and political environments are different ... " Id.
Linton, supra note 21, at 245.
Id. Linton enumerates a list of possible minimum basic rights which would be appli-
cable to underdeveloped countries. His list may be too specific to be applied to the most
underdeveloped countries. A list based on more primary minimum rights than the list Lin-
ton enumerates should be developed but it is beyond the scope of this Note to do so.
24 Sinha, The Anthropocentric Theory of International Law As A Basis For Human
Rights, 10 CAsE W. Rs. J. IN'L L. 443 (1978).
25 Id. at 500.
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tion, and the killers of modern life.2" Sinha then defines as secondary
needs, which should be met after a certain minimum of the basic needs
are met, to be the needs for economic betterment, cultural enrichment,
and achievement of intangible values.21 Under an "anthropocentric" ap-
proach, a list of each country's needs would be made according to its cul-
tural, ideological and economic realities, 8 which would be revised periodi-
cally according to its changing developmental status.29 For Sinha, "the
human rights imperative becomes the fulfillment of man's needs of his
planetary existence with justice."30 Sinha has, in summary, attempted to
develop a flexible theory of human rights based on developmental stages.
While there has been little other theoretical work of this type in the
legal field,$' Sinha's theory coincides with certain needs and development
theories in the psychology of individuals.3 2 Of particular interest is Mas-
low's well-known "needs hierarchy" in which individuals must fulfill (or
be able to fulfill) certain needs before they will take the next step in their
own growth. 3 There are undoubtedly certain steps in the development of
nations which conform to the steps in individual growth." Developmental
psychology may well be applicable to the development of nations. Further
work will be required to see if this line of inquiry will bear fruit.
The lack of consensus regarding the human rights standard must be
taken into account as we formulate an American response to human
26 Id. at 497-98.
27 Id.
Id. at 501.
29 Id. at 476.
so Id. at 501.
31 Marks, Emerging Human Rights: A New Generation for the 1980's, 33 RuTGFRS L.
REv. 435 (1981), and Linton, World Development, Change and The Challenge of Human
Rights, 1978 N.Y.L.J. 242 (1978), both show views which coincide with Sinha's theory.
Neither author, however, gets beyond the point of observation of relevant trends to the
formulation of new general theories as a basis for determining human rights standards.
" See generally A. MASLow, TOWARD A PSYCHOLOGY of BEING (1968); J. LOEVIGNE,
EGO DmRoP ENTr (1976); and E. ERRSON, IDENTrrY: YouTH AND CRISIS (1968). These works
and others like them (e.g. psychologists Piaget and Kohlberg) all emphasize that, until one
stage of development is finished by fulfillment of the needs of that particular stage, growth
is subsequently retarded, delayed, or only partial in attempts by the individual to grow to
the next stage.
33 A. MASLOW, supra note 32.
" Cf. the recent work of Wilber, Ontogenetic Development: Two Fundamental Pat-
terns, 13 J. TRANSPEESONAL PSYCHOLOGY 33 (1981). Wilber's work would further suggest that
certain aspects of each developmental stage are retained by individuals as growth continues
through each stage and that the current stages of development in which individuals find
themselves are those toward which the individuals' energies are primarily directed. This
task orientation also seems to be evident in the growth of individual nations although in-
depth work in this area has yet to be satisfactorily concluded. See also Pearce, On Cycles
and Schools, J. OF HOLIsTIc HEALTH 123, 125-7 (1981), for work of a similar nature.
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rights questions. If we fail to be consistent and thoughtful in our re-
sponses to these questions we will lose credibility abroad and, ultimately,
lose our self-confidence as a nation able to carry our moral good inten-
tions into action.
III. THE TRADITIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS POLICY OF THE UNrED STATES
The United States has a history of involvement in causes which it
has believed on a moral level to be in the interest of securing the rights
and freedoms of countries around the world."' Since the Second World
War the Untied States has also been instrumental in helping to frame
and implement policies of the United Nations with respect to human
rights.3 6 More recently, the United States involved itself in the Korean
War and the Vietnam conflict in a substantial effort, rightly or wrongly,
to stem the flow of Communism, an ideology which the United States has
seen to be inimical to individual freedoms and rights.37 Following Nixon's
Presidency and the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, Jimmy Carter became
" See, e.g., BARNr, THE GArNrs 76-77 (1977). In comments about the articulation of
American ideology, the author writes, "From Franklin Roosevelt to Jimmy Carter, the idea
that America's mission was to spread freedom has taken many forms." Id. at 76. The Ameri-
can ideological interest in the freedom of other peoples pre-dates the Roosevelt era, how-
ever. For example, as early as 1917 there was considerable Congressional debate regarding
the Bolshevik revolution and subsequent instability in areas surrounding the U.S.S.R.
" The U.N. Charter was the result of the work of the victorious nations of World War
H, at the San Francisco Conference of 1945. The United States was a full party to the
deliberations and efforts at the Conference. See C. BLACK & E. HELMREICH, A HIsTORY of
TwENrsm CzNTuY EuRoPE 587-88 (4th ed. 1972). Prior to the San Francisco Conference
the United States had a hand in the preparation of the "Dumbarton Oaks Proposals" which
were the foundation proposals upon which the U.N. Charter was framed. Id. at 586. The
first U.S. representative to the U.N. Human Rights Commission was Eleanor Roosevelt who
had an important hand in framing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the two
International Covenants, and the Genocide Convention. Id. at 867. See also S. HRsHAN, A
WOMAN OF QUALITY 247-48 (1970).
7 See Pmuas, THE TnuMAN PRsmE'cy 306 (1966) where Phillips paraphrased NSC-
68. NSC-68 is a classified national security policy paper analyzing the U.S. position vis-a-vis
the U.S.S.R. in the 1950's. Phillips paraphrase states that-
Kremlin policy has three main objectives: (1) to preserve and to strengthen its
position as the ideological and power center of the Communist world; (2) to ex-
tend and to consolidate that power by the acquisition of new satellites; and (3) to
oppose and to weaken any competing system of power that threatens Communist
world hegemony.
These objectives are inimical to American ideals which are predicated on
the concepts of freedom and dignity. (Emphasis added)
See also DONovAN, Tim COLD WAmuoRs 272-73 (1974). That author points out that the NSC
policy papers were primarily based on the containment doctrine. The containment doctrine
was used to justify increases in U.S. military involvement abroad in the 1950's and 1960's.
Such involvement included Korea and Vietnam and was specifically based on the goal of
halting the advance of Communism in those countries.
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President and began to emphasize human rights as one of the principle
concerns of U.S. foreign policy."s Carter pursued his human rights objec-
tives with great zeal, primarily because he saw the need to re-establish
the United States as a credible moral leader at home and abroad after the
debacle of Vietnam and the Watergate scandal. 9
While Carter's efforts were well received at home, they were far less
well received abroad. 40 Other countries were understandably concerned
about the degree to which the United States would attempt to thrust its
human rights policy on them with the possible result that the United
States would intervene in their conduct of foreign affairs and concomitant
human rights policies.41 This concern of other countries was little under-
stood by the Carter Administration.42 The open discussion of human
'" See President Jimmy Carter, The President's Commencement Address at the Uni-
versity of Notre Dame, 53 NomE DAME LAw. 9 (1976). In that speech the President said the
following regarding human rights:
We are confident that democracy's example will be compelling, and so we seek to
bring that example closer to those from whom in the past few years we have been
separated and who are not yet convinced about the advantages of our kind of life.
We are confident that democratic methods are the most effective and so we are
not tempted to employ improper tactics at home or abroad. (Emphasis added)
See also THE HOUSE SuBcoMMrrrEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANZAIONS AND MOVEMENTS OF
THE HOUSE COMMIT= ON FOREIGN AFFAmS, HuMN RmHrs IN THE WORLD CommuMNTY: A
CALL FOR U.S. LEADERSHIP, 93d Cong. 2d Seas. (Comm. Print 1974). In these hearings recom-
mendations were made that the United States adopt a human rights policy that showed
American concern for human rights in all countries of the world regardless of the ideological
beliefs of particular countries. The hearings reflected then growing concern regarding the
type of selectivity with which the United States had pursued its human rights policies. Dur-
ing his Presidency, Carter echoed many of the themes expressed in these hearings. But cf.,
Derian (Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs in the U.S. Dept.
of State under Carter), Human Rights in American Foreign Policy, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW.
264 (1979), in which Derian states:
[T]he international law of human rights must be applied through.. .a complex
process, through a wide range of efforts to induce, persuade, and cajole obser-
vance - and to make it clear that violations will cost something in relations with
other nations. The nations themselves, and to a lesser extent international organi-
zations, control the means to enforce this human rights law and the stronger a
nation is, the better its ability to perform this function. (Emphasis added)
The contradiction between Carter's remarks and Derian's comments show that Carter's Ad-
ministration tried to win adherents to its human rights policy both by showing democracy's
best side and use of coercive force abroad. This contradiction added to misunderstanding of
Carter's human rights policy.
" See Schacter, International Law Implications of U.S. Human Rights Policies, 24
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 63, 65 (1978).
40 Id.
41 Id.
4, See supra note 38 and accompanying text. See also Linton, supra note 21, at 242,
where Linton misunderstands the Carter Administration's emphasis on human rights as a
"political fashion wave" rather than as a bona fide expression of the long-term political
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rights initiated by the Carter Administration seemed to belie its stated
preference for "quiet diplomacy.""' It also raised questions in the world
community about how much credence the United States actually ac-
corded the international legal process. One commentator observed that:
The [Carter] Administration, and especially the Congress, seem to lack
any understanding of the fact that both intergovernmental relations and
human rights are increasingly subject to the international legal principles
and instruments, whose provisions should at least be consulted and re-
ferred to before deciding on a course of action.4 4
Part of the reason for lack of understanding on the part of the
United States of other countries' concerns is its belief in the superiority
of its own form of government. 45 Other peoples and their governments
have their own national historical predispositions and naturally do not
automatically share American views.4 e Additionally, the United States has
not fully appreciated the effect that its lack of consent to any of the inter-
national human rights agreements (except the U.N. Charter) has had on
the credibility of U.S. involvement in human rights issues in the world
community.47 To the United States, lack of consent to the agreements has
been fully understandable. Signature of those agreements could mean
possible intervention in U.S. domestic affairs by other countries if those
other countries perceived violations of human rights as occurring in the
United States.48 On the other hand, all signatories of those human rights
agreements have risked the same intervention in their domestic affairs by
other countries and do not understand why, if the government of the
United States is the "best in the world," it will still not subject itself to
concern of the United States in the human rights area.
43 See Vance, Human Rights and Foreign Policy, 7 GA. J. INT'L. L. & Comp. L. 223, 226
(1977). See also Derian, Quiet Diplomacy Is Not Silent Diplomacy, 9 HuM. RTS. 16, 17
(1979).
4 Szasz, The International Legal Aspects of the Human Rights Policy of the United
States, 12 CORNELL INTL. L. J. 161, 162 (1979).
45 Carter, supra note 38.
46 See, e.g., Linton, supra note 21, at 243.
'" The obligations of the U.N. Charter are perceived by the United States to be only
generally binding. See Humphrey, The Implementation of International Human Rights
Law, 24 N.Y.L. ScH. L. RIv. 31, 35 (1978). The general binding nature of the Charter has
not, however, implied specific implementation of the Charter in our human rights policies
except where the United States has deemed such implementation to be in the best interests
of the United States. Id. at 34-35.
41 See L. HENIUN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONsTrrIUION 151-52 (1972). The author
states that- "[U]nder the Constitution only matters of international concern are permissible
subjects for treaties." Since signing the international agreements could have domestic law
implications for the United States, the United States has thus far not seen fit to sign them;
signature to those agreements could potentially impinge on our national sovereignty. See
also Humphrey, supra note 47, at 35.
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outside scrutiny regarding human rights. Without such scrutiny, the U.S.
has still felt comfortable in criticizing other countries' conduct and poli-
cies regarding human rights.49 Therefore, what the U.S. may perceive as
an understandable contradiction in the U.S. policy toward human rights,
other countries may regard as hypocrisy.50 Without attempting to resolve
this contradiction in the American national stance regarding human
rights, the U.S. will continue to confuse other countries about its actual
intentions. Additionally, the United States has confined its national dia-
logue on human rights to internationally recognized human rights, thus
avoiding the confrontation of the inherent contradiction between U.S.
human rights policy abroad and the lack of U.S. adoption of that same
policy at home.5
1
Concern for national security has further' exacerbated the contradic-
tions in the U.S. policy regarding human rights. National security is obvi-
ously within the federal government's domain.52 To that end, Congress
has rightfully given foreign assistance consistent with perceived national
security needs.53 A secondary objective in giving foreign assistance has
49 Henkin, Rights: American and Human, 79 COLUm. L. REv. 405, 421 (1979). The au-
thor there states:
[T]he United States has not been a pillar of human rights, only a 'flying but-
tress'-supporting them from the outside. Human rights have been a kind of
'white man's burden'; international human rights have been for export only. Con-
gress has invoked international human rights standards only as a basis for sanc-
tions against other countries. President Carter has invoked human rights in crit-
icism of others.
In a word, we have not accepted human rights for ourselves. We supported the
Universal Declaration only because it was not to have the status of law or interna-
tional obligation. We have adhered to hardly any human rights agreements. (Em-
phasis added).
Cf. Schachter, supra note 39, at 69-73, who provides a good discussion about the use of
censure by the United States and the fact that censure is close to, but does not constitute,
intervention in the affairs of other countries.
50 See Henkin, supra note 49 and accompanying text.
51 Schacter, supra note 39, at 75.
52 U.S. CONsT. art. I, §§ 8 & 10; art. H1, § 2.
53 See 22 U.S.C. § 2301 (1976). This section contains the Congressional statement re-
garding the ends to which U.S. military assistance and sales are to be directed. This section,
in part, specifically provides that:
In enacting this legislation, it is therefore the intention of the Congress to
promote the peace of the world and the foreign policy, security and general wel-
fare of the United States by fostering an improved climate of political indepen-
dence and individual liberty, improving the ability of friendly countries and inter-
national organizations to deter or, if necessary, defeat Communist or Communist-
supported aggression, facilitating arrangements for individual and collective secur-
ity, assisting friendly countries to maintain internal security, and creating an envi-
ronment of security and stability in the developing 'friendly countries essential to
their more rapid social, economic, and political progress.
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been the improvement of the human rights performance in recipient
countries." Because U.S. national security needs and human rights con-
cerns often conflict, human rights concerns have been manifested in U.S.
foreign assistance efforts in an inconsistent manner. Also because of this
conflict, "we have too often tried to promote human rights in alliance
with those very groups who were the chief violators." ' Thus, the caprice
of U.S. national security interests has promoted disregard of human fac-
tors in the giving of U.S. assistance.5 6 Though this approach may meet
the short-term security needs, it inhibits the achievement of stated U.S.
human rights goals and damages U.S. credibility abroad. (See section IV
of this Note.)
The emphasis on human rights shifts somewhat from administration
to administration.57 President Carter's public discussion of human rights
has now been replaced by President Reagan's emphasis on various types
of diplomatic conversation in this area. Regardless of the administration
at the helm, however, the contradictory aspects of U.S. policies regarding
human rights remain unresolved. Until such resolution is achieved, the
United States will continue to pursue inconsistent human rights policies
and consequently fail to reap adequate results from those policies.
IV. AN INTERIM PROPOSAL FOR THE HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY OF THE
UNITED STATES
The United States must reassess its current policy on human rights
by making it both more realistic and more credible. The human rights
policy the U.S. has followed has not been realisitic because it has based
that policy more on its ideological vision of the world than on the actual
" See 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (1976). This section contains the Congressional statement of
limitations which have been imposed on the giving of U.S. development assistance to coun-
tries which engage in flagrant human rights violations. This section specifically provides in
part (a) that:
No assistance may be provided under sub-chapter I of this chapter to the
government of any country which engages in a consistent pattern of gross viola-
tions of internationally recognized human rights, including torture or cruel, inhu-
man, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without charges,
or other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, and the security of person,
unless such assistance will directly benefit the needy people in such country.
While the effectiveness of the means to implement this human rights limitation on the giv-
ing of development assistance have been questioned, the Congressional objectives contained
in this section are clear.
55 Dalley, Human Rights: The Most Practical Concern of Effective Foreign Policy, 8
Hum. RTs. 36, 40 (1979). See also Nayar, Human Rights: The United Nations and U.S.
Foreign Policy, 19 HARv. INTL. L.J. 813, at 829 (1978).
5McHendry, Ethics, Values and the Common Good as Guidelines For a World Com-
munity, 7 OTTAWA L. REv. 330, 357 (1975).
"= See Szasz, supra note 44, at 161.
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situations that face many of the countries with which it deals. U.S. policy
has not been credible because it has been inconsistent in its formulation
and implementation. However, regardless of the failings of current U.S.
human rights policy, it has nonetheless shown the world that the U.S. has
the will and the desire to meet its goals in this area. That will and desire
can enable the U.S. to move beyond current inabilities in reaching its
stated human rights goals. The foundation of the interim proposal con-
tained in this Note is that the United States must base its human rights
policy and foreign assistance on the needs and stages of development
which are found in each foreign country. This proposal would also require
the United States to make a clear national statement in writing of its
human rights goals. Such a statement would remedy the contradiction
between current lack of U.S. adherence to the international human rights
agreements and the human rights goals which the U.S. purports to hold
as a nation.
The first step toward improvement of the U.S. human rights policy
is a reduction in its credibility gap.58 Worldwide, "[t]he misuse of govern-
mental powers and the massive violations of human rights often amount-
ing to genocide, has brought international law and the rule of law into
public contempt." 59 If the U.S. fails to reduce its credibility gap in the
area of human rights, we risk deterioration of moral force abroad and face
the possibility of immobilization of the entire human rights effort by in-
coherence and paralysis. 0
The most potent means of reducing the U.S. credibility gap is for the
U.S. to open itself to information in addition to that gained from the
governmental elites of its own country and those of foreign govern-
ments. 1 It is inherent in the structure of elites to be closed in upon them-
" See MacDermot, The Credibility Gap in Human Rights, 3 DALHOUSE L.J. 262
(1974).
19 MacBride, The Enforcement of the International Law of Human Rights, 1981 U.
ILL. L. REv. 385, 389 (1981).
" Wolf, supra note 15, at 181. There Wolf comments that, "The present situation is too
often analogous to a score of hypothetical national ministries issuing vast numbers of orders
and regulations without any central coordination. The duplication of effort and the resulting
overlapping or contradictory consequences may reduce the entire collective effort to inco-
herence and paralysis." Id.
61 One of the most important problems facing the U.S. foreign policy elite is their reli-
ance in decision-making on information from scholarly work that is more interested in par-
ticular ideological goals than realistic approaches to implementation of human rights. "Ad-
vocacy has replaced serious study to such an extent that law and wishful thinking are
inextricably tangled." Watson, Legal Theory, Efficacy and Validity in the Development of
Human Rights, 79 U. ILL. L. F. 609, 641 (1979). Advocacy has supplanted realistic analysis
as the basis for much scholarship in the area of human rights. Additionally, attempts by
scholars to convince others of a commonality of human rights before such commonality can
be seen in the practice of nations confounds the possibility of formulating a realistic analy-
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selves, thus breeding inability to execute their policies and arrogance in
pursuit of their goals.62 Lack of information from non-elite sources is an
important defect in the policy-making ability of developed countries."5
This defect is also equally evident in the policy-making ability of Third
World countries who are often more eager to achieve modernity and a
place in the developed world than they are concerned with the needs of
indigenous populations and their rights."
To remedy this defect, it is important that the U.S. gather informa-
tion from its own governmental elite and the elites of other countries in
conjunction with gathering additional information from non-governmen-
tal organizations.6 5 This will enable the U.S. to make more realistic as-
sessments of the current needs and stage of development existing in each
country with which it deals. This is currently being done on a very lim-
ited scale. Needs assessment should be expanded and all available infor-
mation should be integrated into the formulation of national U.S. policies
toward other governments. This should be done before trying to imple-
ment U.S. human rights changes or voicing objections toward any country
in the international community.66 The United States cannot continue to
sis. See, e.g., McDougal, et al, Human Rights and Jurisprudence, 9 HOFsTRA L. REv. 341
(1981), in which the statement is made that, "Scholars have neither adequately clarified the
common interest of all individuals in the greater production and wider sharing of human
rights values nor created among individuals the appropriate perceptions of such common
interests." (Emphasis added).
Where common interests have not shown themselves to be articulable, how can scholars
show such "commonality?" Can scholarly creation of a matrix of common interest be sure
of its accuracy when it is not based on examination of the cultural relativity of human rights
nor on the developmental stages shown in various societies? The earth has again become flat
because we have yet to test our theories adequately to determine if they bear any actual
relationship to the ground on which we stand. "Theory and reality grow farther apart as
academics work zealously for implementation of human rights as they understand them."
(Emphasis added). Murphy, Objections to Western Conceptions of Human Rights, 9 HoF-
SmA L. REv. 433, 435 (1980). Scholars in this area of inquiry must regain integrity in their
analysis by setting aside their own ideological presuppositions as they begin their analyses.
This is particularly important in an area in which scholars so much influence the policy-
making elite of the United States.
'2 Jenkins, The Concept of Rights and the Competence of Courts: Health Care as a
Right, 18 Am. J. JuRs. 1, 11 (1973).
" Linton, supra note 21, at 243.
" Id. at 244.
" E.g., information from organizations such as Amnesty International which have a his-
tory of more unbiased and even-handed reporting on certain typps of conditions in individ-
ual countries should be more consistently integrated into the formation of our human rights
policy. See Steiner & Vagts, supra note 2, at 391-93. For an example of the practical
problems which can be engendered by lack of information from non-governmental sources,
see Balmer, The Use of Conditions In Foreign Relations Legislation, 7 DEN. J. INT'L. L. &
POL. 197, 222 (1978).
£6 This type of integrated analysis would also assist the U.S. government and U.S. com-
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act as if the right hand did not know what the left hand is doing in the
formulation of national policy and still maintain its credibility abroad.
The importance of more open and unbiased information acquisition
is that it will enable the United States to assess the developmental needs
of each country. Each country is on a path of development which is par-
ticular to itself because of the peculiarities of its own history. Each coun-
try has different national attributes to contribute to the world commu-
nity. The United States must stop its pursuit of and support for
developmental homogeneity. If it can do so, it will contribute to the
achievement of stronger self-identities within each nation. Also, expecta-
tions at each country would develop that would be compatible with the
abilities of each to govern its own people and achieve peaceful co-exis-
tence with its neighbors. Peaceful co-existence is made more difficult
when a country is obstructed by outside forces from pursuit of its own
natural growth. The natural growth of each country may not entail devel-
opment in the sense that Western industrialized nations now conceive of
it.6 Growth in most nations will probably entail certain aspects of West-
ern developmental structure, but determination of the amount of empha-
sis on Western developmental structure must be determined by each
country and not by external forces.
The second step toward improvement of the U.S. human rights pol-
icy should be to allow formation of the type of human rights within each
country that will be recognizable as human rights to citizens of that coun-
try. Attempts to have Western-style human rights standards adopted in
every country should not be allowed.
Different social systems, with their own economic, cultural, and ideologi-
cal particularity, have different ways of going about achieving the satis-
faction of the needs of those who compare their membership. (T)he task
of the human rights movements is to see that within the context of dif-
fering systems.. .the human rights imperative and justice in fulfillment
of man's needs is satisfied."
If the U.S. is truly interested in helping other countries achieve growth
and freedom and are motivated to cultivate allies that will stand by her
because of real self-interest on their part to align themselves with U.S.
panies in assessing better the likelihood of expropriation of U.S. businesses abroad. The
Hickenlooper Amendment, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(1), presently is designed to enable U.S. gov-
ernment to withhold foreign assistance from any country that expropriates U.S. businesses
abroad without giving compensation for such expropriations(s). Such sanction, however, is
solely retrospective in nature. Better analysis of on-going situations within countries where
U.S. companies are located would enable the U.S. to take interim preventative steps to pro-
tect U.S. companies abroad where expropriation looks likely before it occurs.
67 See Linton, supra note 21, at 243-245.
" Sinha, supra note 24, at 501.
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goals, the U.S. will not indiscriminately use coercion to achieve "freedom"
or "development" in other countries. "Every State has an inalienable
right to choose its political, economic, social and cultural systems without
any interference in any form by another State.""9
The United States should, instead, request every country with which
she deals to make an official comprehensive statement of its human rights
policy and methods used to implement that policy. By such statements,
objective standards can be established which can be used to compare the
stated human rights goals of each country with its actual performance. 70
Use of such objective standards would enable the United States to be
more realistic about the human rights policies it chooses to support
abroad. Additionally, use of such standards would encourage all govern-
ments to conform to their stated human rights objectives as much as pos-
sible to avoid the risk of loss of their credibility at home and abroad. If
each country produced a statement of its own human rights objectives
that was in accord with its actual historical development, a universal and
achievable standard of human rights could be synthesized in the future.71
The third and last step towards improvement of the U.S. human
rights policy is for the U.S. to support only those foreign governments
that show they are making realistic strides toward the achievement of
their human rights goals. As a corollary, in giving U.S. economic and mili-
tary assistance to foreign governments, Congress should give such assis-
tance only in ways that are potentially useful to the recipient country in
achieving their stated human rights goals and which are in concert with
the human rights goals of the United States.
National determination of what the United States perceives to be re-
alistic goals for human rights must, therefore, be a priority for the United
States.72 Such determination is a prerequisite to the intelligent giving of
'9 Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation Among States in Accordance With The Charter of the United Nations, adopted
Oct. 24, 1970, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 1, U.N. Doe. A/8082 (1965).
70 An objective standard would entail observation of whether a given country's stated
goals are being reasonably fulfilled by its actual practices. Until relative conformity of goals
with actual practice is achieved there cannot be said to exist enforceable human rights. See
Watson, supra note 61, at 611 where he says, "If the practice of states does not show that
there is an international regime of human rights, then one cannot conclude on the basis of
custom that such rules exist." Sufficient custom has not yet been established in the area of
human rights so as to enable the development of an international standard of human rights
performance. (See section II of this note.)
71 See MacDermot, supra note 58. The author comments, "It would undoubtedly be a
useful contribution to the understanding and acceptance of human rights if lawyers from
other legal systems could draw up authoritative statements of human rights based on their
own legal traditions." Id. at 263.
712 See Ferguson, supra note 14, at 376, where the author argues that, until we have
internationally enforceable rights, national implementation of human rights standards is the
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assistance to other countries. Just as we should require statements of
human rights goals from other countries, the U.S. also should make an
official comprehensive statement to the international community of its
human rights goals and internal methods of implementation of those
goals. Such a statement should be of greater specificity than a simple
statement of general desire to comply with the U.N. Charter or a simplis-
tic reliance on the U.S. Constitution or Bill of Rights to provide the U.S.
statement of human rights goals to the international community. An offi-
cial statement by the United States to this end would allow assessment
by other countries of our goals and achievements in the area of human
rights. It would also show the areas in which we are currently attempting
to make progress. A statement of this kind would still some of the criti-
cism directed at the United States for its failure to sign the Declaration,
the Covenants and the various Conventions, as long as it continues to be
unable to sign them because of constitutional limitations. Also, such a
statement would subject the United States to a standard similar to that
which all other countries are subjected. Under such an approach, the
United States would be held only to such a human rights standard as is
appropriate to its current needs and stage of development.
With or without proclamation of a national statement of U.S. human
rights objectives, action by the Congress and the President regarding both
military and economic assistance to other countries "must take into ac-
count the ethics and values of the people of the developing state."1 3 The
U.S. must integrate its own values into the granting of assistance to other
countries so that it is not given solely on the basis of U.S. security inter-
ests. The U.S. must not give military aid to underdeveloped countries
which would exceed their ability to utilize such assistance primarily for
achievement of their own internal security. All assistance, including mili-
tary assistance, must be given according to the developmental state and
needs of the recipient country.
"Aid is the one area where the Constitution gives Congress almost
complete control over policy issues normally reserved to the President.
There it can attach the conditions it wishes land encourage or discourage
practices it chooses. 74 Theoretically at least, it is also through influence
on the Congress that the American people can attempt to directly affect
the human rights policies of the United States. In its role as the voice of
the American people, Congress must assert! itself more forcefully in the
formation and implementation of the human rights policies of the United
States. Without Congressional influence on the Presidential formation of
appropriate interim step.
71 McHendry, supra note 56, at 356.
74 Balmer, The Use of Conditions In Foreign Relations Legislation, 7 DEN. J. INT'L L.
& POL. 197, 238 (1978).
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the U.S. human rights policy, the United States will not be able to articu-
late a statement of its human rights goals that is in accord with its na-
tional values.
In the pursuit of a more realistic human rights policy worldwide, the
United States must reduce its credibility gap in this area, allow other
countries to formulate their own human rights policies according to their
developmental needs, and give assistance to other countries only when
their performances show that they are taking adequate steps toward im-
plementation of their human rights objectives. Realistic achievement in
the area of human rights must precede the formulation of a comprehen-
sive theory of human rights."8 By making a concerted effort in the direc-
tions outlined above, the United States can more realistically reassert it-
self as a proponent of human rights with greater moral credibility in the
world community. These interim steps would enable a more practical pol-
icy toward human rights to be formulated and implemented by the
United States at this time. These steps also would enable worldwide de-
velopment of human rights objectives and standards with concomitent
positive impetus toward the eventual formulation of a truly universal
standard of implementable human rights .7
V. CONCLUSION
This Note has proposed several ways to improve the human rights
policy of the United States. The proposal itself is designed to bring our
human rights rhetoric and performance closer together. Though not com-
prehensive, this Note provides a starting point for the use of a develop-
mental analytical framework for the formation of modem human rights
law.
Cooperation between countries with different needs and in different
developmental stages will yield greater benefits for all than do our cur-
rent over-generalized human rights goals and implementation strategies.
75 See Watson, supra note 61, at 620-21, where the author states: "At no time in the
past has a legislative system preceded or created political stability. The consistent pattern
has been for political factors to create a status quo, a power structure within which a legal
system subsequently evolves. To this extent, reality must always precede theory." (Em-
phasis added).
78 A universal standard of implementable human rights must precede any construction
of "supranational" or "world" law. International law has been changed by the press of
human rights concerns in the direction of changing the international legal system toward a
world legal system; but such change will not be possible to achieve until articulation of the
rights which are to be protected by a world system is accomplished. The concept of world
law has only been seriously discussed in recent years. See Humphrey, Implementation of
International Human Rights Law, 24 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 31, 33 (1978). But see Watson,
Legal Theory, Efficacy and Validity in the Development of Human Rights, 79 U. ILL. L.F.
609 (1979).
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With more open interaction between Congress and the Executive, the
United States can resolve its internal contradictions in the area of human
rights and diminish its lack of credibility abroad. The United States
should issue a national statement of U.S. human rights goals and request
that other countries do the same. Assessment of the efforts toward imple-
mentation of human rights policies of each country can then be made by
comparing the statements of human rights goals made by a country and
its actual performance.
"[F]or the first time in history we can be prophetic without being
missionary, we can be practical without succumbing to 'realpolitik', [and]
we can be effective without imposing our will by means of our might.""7
Coercion of other governments and peoples to conform to American stan-
dards of human rights without including cultural relativity in the equa-
tion will result in further erosion of U.S. credibility abroad. The United
States finally may have reached the level of maturity in its own develop-
ment where it can allow other countries to pursue their own paths of de-
velopment, help those countries whose goals and implementation policies
conform to our own values in human rights, and hold less malice toward
(and give no aid to) those countries whose behavior towards their own
citizens we do not wholeheartedly support. This stance on human rights
would be realistic for the United States. It would also bring us back to
the forefront as a promoter of the rights and freedoms of all peoples. Our
hope for the achievement of universal human rights in the future rests on
the realistic pursuit of human rights policies today.
7 Dalley, supra note 55, at 41.
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